Angie Motshekga must resign – SADTU

Union condemns minister for unilateral introduction of biometric registration system, withdrawal of Collective Agreement no.1 of 2011


05 March 2013

SADTU calls for Basic Education Ministers resignation

A special National Executive Committee of SADTU has expressed its loss of confidence in the minister of basic education in leading the department and ensuring the protection of  collective bargaining – a critical right we have as workers which should be protected at all times. The special NEC which took place in Kempton Park yesterday (4 March, 2013) therefore resolved that the Minister of Basic Education, Ms Angie Motshekga must submit her resignation with immediate effect.

On the 12th of February, Minister Angie Motshekga unilaterally and with immediate effect, withdrew Collective Agreement No.1 of 2011. Ironically, this happened on the day of our picket to the Basic Education headquarters in defence of collective bargaining and the promotion of labour peace.

We view this unilateral withdrawal as a blatant assault of collective bargaining and we refuse to stand aside whilst our rights as workers are trampled upon by those in power.

The collective bargaining structures such as the Education Labour Relations Council are products of our struggles. To us, the collective bargaining chambers were established in order to ensure labour peace. The undermining of decisions and agreements taken in such structures is a recipe for disaster in the sector and sets a rather regrettable precedent. The withdrawal is a sign of a lack of appetite to see sustainable labour peace in a sector that has been declared as an apex priority by the ruling party.

We want to remind the minister that SADTU is party to the collective agreement that ensures that there will be no disruptions in education in the foreseeable future.  In the interest of the African working class child, we have held our end of the bargain despite the atrocious conditions that we are exposed to on a daily basis. Our members are still in class teaching under collapsing structures; they are still teaching large class sizes without the necessary learning and teaching materials being delivered on time.

It is clear that the minister has run out of ideas on how to turn around the DBE and has even resorted to publicity stunts such as the announcement of the biometric registration system without even having the decency expected of a minister to engage the major stakeholders.

In her desperate attempt to justify a potential spend of R430 Million on this biometric system where as a significant number of schools still lack basic infrastructure such as electricity, the minister goes on to misrepresent a report by the (Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality) SACMEQ III on teacher absenteeism.

Contrary to her mis-informed assertion that South Africa has the highest teacher absenteeism in SADC, the report states that South Africa is at number four as a country out of 15 countries, with the lowest teacher absenteeism in the SADC region with an average of eight days of absenteeism per teacher per year. Mauritius is the first with an average of six days. Teacher absenteeism in South Africa is in line with the average of SADC countries which is nine days per teacher per year.

The only time when the figures went up to an average of 20 days per year was in 2007 and 2010 due to strikes.  It must be noted however that the “no work, no pay” principle applied regarding those days and they must thus not be misunderstood as leave days.

We find it both absurd and embarrassing that the minister chose to use this extreme example to “create” a non-existent plight in order to justify her introduction of the biometric registration system.

We cannot help it but wonder as to how did the minister know about teacher absenteeism because it was her not so long ago who pleaded with the public to not expect her to know what is happening in class because her function is to develop policy. This is the same minister who pleaded with the nation to not expect her to know how many learners received textbooks, because in her own words she doesn’t deliver textbooks.

Policing teachers should not be her obsession because there is no evidence what so ever to suggest that this would improve their performance and morale which is currently at an all time low under her leadership. It does not take a rocket scientist to figure out that this system has significant inherent flaws within it, for one it will not be able to determine the teacher’s effectiveness inside the classroom and it also will not be able to record when the teacher is out of school due to school activities like sport, excursions and illness.

We are equally interested to know as to who will be on the receiving end of the tender to install this system which we regard as fruitless expenditure. In our conservative estimates, the projected amount of this system can build no less than 30 schools with labs, libraries and sport facilities which can undoubtedly dent the embarrassingly high number of mud and tree schools.

It is becoming difficult to take the minister seriously because it is under her watch that her DG transgresses PFMA regulations and yet she refuses blatantly to take disciplinary action and rather hides behind legal technicalities. We must remind the public that this is the same minister who went on national TV and called for the firing of the then Superintendent General of the Eastern Cape without due processes. The hypocrisy that is now being displayed towards the DG is mind boggling to say the least.

It is as clear as day light that different standards are being applied for certain departmental officials, when teachers misappropriate funds and disregard the PFMA  they get dismissed where as others are not. This indicates that in the minister’s eyes, some individuals in the department are more important than others and an animal farm attitude takes precedence.

The trend that she is setting in the department defies even the anti-corruption stance taken by the president, it is an open secret that she is harbouring individuals in her department that have been suspended for corruption from somewhere else. She is in fact creating a safe hub for corrupt officials.

This is after all the same minister who lacks initiative and embarrassingly copies every policy that is being implemented by the DA in the Western Cape and even through her silence supported the closure of 27 schools in that province.

It would be very ambitious of us however to expect any better from the minister because she deliberately misled parliament at some point and gave an impression that performance contracts for principals exist and on the verge of being signed where as on the contrary we had not even seen the draft of that contract.

It is once again very difficult to take the minister seriously as the teachers when she wrote an open letter early this year to all matriculants apologizing for the inconvenience she has caused in the previous year but hardly an hour after that she tells the nation that there were no problems in Limpopo during the release of matric results.

We have always maintained that her triumphalistic announcement of the matric results was opportunistic and misleading. The improvement cannot be attributed to her only as she wishes. These are our efforts working together with the provincial departments because at national level collective bargaining collapsed the day she appointed Bobby Soobrayan.

Since 2009 the DBE has only concluded two collective agreements and never implemented any of them until the withdrawal of one of them last month. The outstanding issues in the ELRC are: draft agreement on 0,5% progression for parity which has been on ice for months without any shame from the minister, the OSD for office based personnel and School Management Team which seem to have fallen through the cracks.

The special NEC resolved that if the minister does not submit her long awaited resignation we will limit our interaction with the department to the employment contract and strictly within the working hours only. When it comes to marking, all SADTU members will no longer be available to mark supplementary exams, the ANA scripts and the end year exams because the collective agreement speaking to these functions has been withdrawn.

We will not participate in any departmental programme at all levels and we will not take any instruction from the ministry or department, ours will be to be in schools for 7 hours and no extra effort beyond that must be expected from us. We will go further and lobby all the other public sector unions to withdraw from the 3 year collective agreement that was intended to ensure labour peace because the minister has no intention to sustain it. We will further call upon all our members to boycott the upcoming teacher awards.

We have therefore reached a stage where we can make a passionate call to the minister to do the honourable thing and take the road less travelled by submitting her resignation as the minister of basic education with immediate effect. We are hopeful that this resignation which we are looking forward to, will have an annexure being the resignation of the DG of the department, Bobby Soobrayan.

The special NEC also resolved that the campaigns committee of the union must draw up a programme of action to mobilize all our members for an indefinite strike as a response to the assault on collective bargaining, our basic right as workers and to promote quality public education.


The special NEC went further and deliberated on the recent developments within the federation COSATU. It is our view that media leakages take away the rights of the central executive committee to lead such as those that characterized the issues around the general secretary of the federation. Whilst the issues of the “commission of enquiry on the federation’s property” have been clarified by the federation, it is highly unacceptable that the media was unduly provided with information on internal matters albeit very misleading.

As an independent and autonomous organisation and affiliate of COSATU in good standing, we want to call upon all affiliates to respect our views because we have confidence in our democratic and internal processes. We call upon those unions that call others “funny people” and appeal to members to crush leaders to stop immediately.

We reject the recently published views by one Zackie Achmat on COSATU. Achmat is not a member of any affiliate within the federation. We want him to retract his statement and apologise to COSATU.  Achmat made his views known before the Mangaung conference that if President Zuma is re-elected he will resign from the ANC, so we are not surprised by his ill-informed assertion. We do not need his views in our internal matters in the federation because no one is bigger than the federation.

We have also observed a foreign tendency in our federation, we received an email from one Yoliswa Dwane representing Equal Education soliciting support for the General Secretary of COSATU amongst NGOs. We view this act as being provocative and dangerous in the trade union movement. It is unprecedented and we will not leave this matter unattended because it seeks to sow divisions in the federation.

Statement issued by SADTU, March 5 2013



ANC in Cape Town fails to support R472m tax-break for City’s poor – Ivan Meyer -DA WCape leader says Marius Fransman should apologise for his party’s shameful politicking.

DA WCape leader says Marius Fransman should apologise for his party’s shameful politicking


Fransman must apologize for rejection of R472m tax-break for City’s poor

Marius Fransman, ANC Western Cape Chair, needs to explain to his supporters why the ANC abstained from voting in the City of Cape Town‘s council on a decision to give poor residents a R472 million tax break.

The DA-led council adopted a majority recommendation to write off the interest on the arrears for properties with a municipal valuation of R300 000 or less.

Despite the ANC’s unwillingness to vote on the recommendation, council adopted it and the total amount of charges to be written off for qualifying poor residents amounts to R472 million.

In her State of the Province Address last week, the Premier, Helen Zille, stated that 76% of the annual budget of the DA led Western Cape government is directed towards opening opportunities for people in poor communities.

Clearly the DA puts its money where its mouth is. Unlike the ANC in this province that constantly claims to have the best interest of the poor at heart but then refuses to support a recommendation that does just that!

Mr Fransman must publically apologize to poor residents of Cape Town for this shameful politicking by the ANC.

One of the greatest challenges in the Western Cape is the alleviation of poverty.

The DA believes that every citizen of the Western Cape should have the freedom to improve their lives and break the cycle of poverty.

This can only be achieved through real and tangible initiatives like the one before council yesterday and not through political grandstanding and empty promises.

Statement issued by Ivan Meyer, Leader of the DA in the Western Cape, February 28 2013


Why we reject the Community Safety Bill – ANC WCape

Songezo Mjongile says bill aimed at creating constitutional and inter-governmental conflict



1. Executive Summary

On behalf of the African National Congress Western Cape, after careful consideration and thorough analysis of the Western Cape Community Safety Bill we hereby wish to place on record our ( ANC Western Cape) objection to key sections of the Western Cape Community Safety Bill ( hereafter referred to as the Bill). This includes but is not limited to:

That the Bill is unconstitutional in both letter and spirit in many respects in that the bill seeks to undermine Section 203 and 206 of the South African Constitution Act 108 of 1996 ( hereafter referred to as the Constitution) read together with Schedule 4 and 5 of the Constitution which sets out clearly and specifically the powers and functions of the different spheres of government .

Furthermore, that the bill in certain areas is in direct conflict with the Civilan Secretariat For Police Act 2 of 2011 which specifically outlines the powers and functions of the National and Provincial Secretariats for Safety and Security as it relates to civilian oversight as well as the SAPS Act amongst others.

In this regard it is our understanding that the bill in its current form seeks to encroach upon and at times duplicate the powers and functions of the National Secretariat and the IPID as it relates to civilian oversight amongst others.

Furthemore that the intention of the bill is to unconstitutionally,illegally and surreptitiously expand the powers of the Provincial MEC of Community Safety and the Provincial Cabinet.

Section 206 of the Constitution of the RSA is clear that a member of the provincial executive is responsible for policing functions assigned to it ito national legislation and national policy. The Western Cape Community Safety Bill contravenes the Constitution of RSA, since the province intends to assign powers to the MEC for policing functions through provincial legislation.

This encroachment is not only unconstitutional but it will moreover create inherent constitutional, legislative and intergovernmental conflict and tension as well as the possible duplication of functions. In addition it may have by implication ( as a result of the duplication of functions) the unintended consequences of inefficient, fruitless and wasteful expenditure.

In this regard the establishment of the Office of the Provincial Ombudsman as well as the Provincial Advisory Committee to the MEC for Community Safety are some examples of structures to be established that will amount to duplication of functions and a fruitless and wasteful expenditure. As regards the Ombudsmen’s Office there are already numerous existing structures and institutions that have been established many years ago which are already fulfilling these functions including the IPID and the Public Protector.

Furthermore, the bill has the unintended / perhaps intended consequences of curtailling communities democratic participation within community structures such as CPF’s by diluting its electoral process of CPF’ members. For example S5 of the Bill gives the MEC power to appoint CPF members, indicating once again the DA governments disdain for democratic participation of our communities in general and the poorer african and coloured communities in particular.

We have no doubt that this deeply disturbing trend which permeates much of the bill is deliberately designed to curtail the powers of communities who disagree with the policy direction of the department and the DA in particular as it relates to safety and security. It furthemore is evidence of a dangerous pattern that is emerging of a DA government that is intent on politicising the issue of oversight and community safety by bringing in DA deployees to take over the work of both communities and the officials of the Department. Section 25-28 which provides for the establishment of a provincial advisory committee in simpler terms advisors to the MEC is further evidence of this.

The bill also seeks to create a provincial intelligence gathering and analysis structure in violation and conflict with national legislation and policy as it relates to security and information and without taking into account the risks and unintended consequences as it relates to National Security.

Finally, it is our view that many other sections of the Bill as it relates to the broader functions of the Department of Community Safety other than civilian oversight need not be legislated. The current gaps, challenges and weaknesses that the bill is intending to address can be adequately addressed through policy guidelines and / or prescripts and / or standard operating procedure given that the current constitutional and legislative framework is sufficiently clear in respect of the the existing functions of Provincial Departments of Community Safety.

In conclusion having due regard for our above mentioned concerns the ANC is deeply disturbed that the real intention and spirit of this bill may be to create constitutional, legislative and intergovernmental conflict and a crisis to further the DA’s political agenda of opposition for the sake of opposition, rather than to create harmonization between the national, provincial and local spheres of government as it relates to community safety in general and civilian oversight in particular as well as to politicise the issue of safety in our province.

2. Introduction

Section 40 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa state that in the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. The RSA Constitution further states that all spheres of government must adhere to this section of the Constitution and must conduct their activities within parameters of Chapter 3 of the Constitution, which provides 8 principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations and they are quoted as follows:

Section 41(1)(a-h):

(I) All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must preserve

(a) the peace, national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic;

(b) secure thew ell-being of the peopleo f the Republic;

(c) provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the

Republic as a whole;

(d) be loyal to the Constitution, the Republic and its people;

(e) respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the other spheres;

(f) not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of

the Constitution;

(g) exercise.; their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not

encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere; and

(h) co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith.

Section 41 (1)(d, e and f) requires spheres of government to be loyal to the Constitution; respect the Constitutional status, restitutions, powers and function of government in the other spheres and not assume any power orfunction except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution. The Western Cape Provincial Government’s Community Safety Bill goes against the principles of Section 41 (1) of the Constitution of RSA. It does not respect the Constitutional status, powers and functions of government and it assumes powers not conferred upon it in terms of the Constitution of RSA.

Section 206 and Section 208 of the RSA Constitution gives clear powers to the National Minister in terms policing and clearly describe what the National Minister and a Member of the Provincial Executive Council may do in terms of civilian oversight of the police. Both the SAPS Act and a Civilian Secretariat for Police Act was legislated to give effect to the Constitutional principles which clearly spells-out the role and functions of National Government and Provincial Government with regard to policing and the oversight of policing. In this regard the Community Safety Bill is unnecessary, a duplication of current legislations in place and a waste of state resources.

3. Issues in the Western Cape Community Safety Bill

Section 2, Purpose of Act:

This is duplication of the Constitution of the RSA, Section 206(1), (3), (4), (5) and (9) and 207 (5) and (6). For these sections of the Constitution, a SAPS Act and Civilian Secretariat for Police Act was legislated and is in existence, which clearly spell-out the functions of the National Minister, Members of Provincial Executive Councils and the functions of Civilian Secretariats.

Section 3, Functions of Provincial Minister:

S 3(c)

Policing policy is determined by the SAPS and cannot be subjected to the oversight of the Provincial MEC. In any case, the MEC plays a role in shaping the policy in terms of S206

In terms of the provision, the clause may be too wide ranging because the MEC cannot claim powers that is not allocated to them in terms of the Constitution


The MEC should not be recording complaints against the police as one of his functions. The IPID and Secretariat are mandated to do this.

The MEC cannot through this legislation take over the function of a complaints regulating body such as the IPID and Secretariat. It conflicts with established legislation

This section is a duplication of Section 2 as well as conferring extra powers to the Member of the Provincial Executive Council reponsible for policing encroaching on the Constitutional powers of the National Minister.

In addition, the explanation presented in Section 3 of the Western Cape Community Safety Bill is typically defined as a job description for the Provincial Member of the Executive Council responsible for Community Safety and a performance agreement with the Premier of the Western Cape Province.

This Section furthemore contravenes Section 206 (1) of the Constitution of RSA, which clearly state that National policing is the responsibility of the National Minister and only the National Minister can determine national policing policy after consulting with provincial governments.

This Section furthemore contravenes Section 208 of the Constitution of the RSA, which state that a Civilian Secretariat for Police Service must be established by national legislation to function under the direction of the Cabinet Member responsible for policing. However and in contrast, this Section of the Western Cape Community Safety Bill undermines Section 208 of the Constitution of the RSA and confers the Constitutional powers of the Cabinet Member responsible for policing to the Member of the Provincial Executive Council.

The Constitution is clear ito Section 206 and 208 re the powers vested in NAT MIN.

Section 4, Monitoring, oversight and assessment of policing:

In terms of Section 206 (4) of the Constitution of the RSA, a provincial executive is responsible for policing functions assigned to it in terms of national legislation and national policing policy.

The functions of monitoring and oversight of policing is already assigned to the provincial executive in terms of the national legislations namely the SAPS Act and the Civilian Secretariat for Police Act, therefore the Western Cape Community Safety Bill undermines the national legislation and the powers invested to the National Minister and prescribed by the RSA Constitution.

Chapter 2, Section 3 of the SAPS Act prescribes the functions of the secretariat, which is to evaluate the SAPS and in the same chapter, Section 3 (3) says that only the National Minister may make regulations re the establishment and functioning of secretariats and regulations re provincial secretariats in consultation with the executive co-ordinating committee.

Section 4.1 of the Community Safety Bill encroaches and expands the powers of Monitoring and Oversight e of the MEC and therefore is in violation Section 206 and 208 of the Constitution, the SAPS Act and the Civilian Secretariat of Police Service Act. The Civilian Secretariat for Police Service Act, Section 17 (1) (2) prescribes the functions of provincial secretariats. The Community Safety Bill one again undermines and contravenes the SAPS Act and the Civilian Secretariat for Police service Act.

S4(2)& (3)- The provincial Minister should not be allowed to authorise anyone, other than a staff member to perform the functions as proposed in S 4(1) of the Bill

Only employees of the Department should be authorised to interact and work with SAPS for security purposes, otherwise it compromises the security agreements and arrangements with respect to information security.

Section 5, Directives for establishment of community police forums and boards:

S5 (1) Currently clause 18(2) of the SAPS Act notes that the establishment of community police forums do not preclude the police from liaising with any structure other than CPFs

S5(3) places no obligation the Department of Community Safety to make available funding , training and resources. This clause should be reconsidered as CPF’s cannot function without such resources and allows the Department to play politics as to who it supports or not. There should be no discretion and the Department should be obligated to provide such support.

The establishment of Community Police Forums and Community Police Boards are prescribed in the SAPS Act, Chapter 7, (ss 19 – 21). The Community Safety Bill once again duplicates the SAPS Act and undermines the powers of the National Minister in terms creating national regulations and national policy as indicated in Section 206 of the Constitution. More worrying though is that the consequence of this section of the Community Safety Bill is that it will dilute the principles of democratic participation of communities in electing its CPF leadership as CPF members can now also be appointed rather than elected undermining the principles of democracy within CPF’s.

This section is further evidence of the DA lead provincial government’s war on community structures and community participation as the intention is to ensure the withering away of community participation and democratic principles in legislated community structures.

Section 5.2.&3 of the Community Safety Bill re the evaluation and support of CPFs does not need to be legislated (only national can legislate). This is a policy matter that cab be and is already dealt with via Provincial Cabinet Resolution (there is already a Provincial Cabinet Resolution re support and funding to CPFs and other organizations – 1999). Any updates and amendments can be dealt with via an amendment to the resolution.

Section 6, Accreditation of and support to neighbourhood watches:

The section does not need legislation since the provincial executive can only perform policing functions assigned to it by national legislation. The province should rather focus on policy for neighbourhood watches through a provincial cabinet resolution. Having noted the above there remains a number of concerns iro the drafting of this section which includes but is not limited to :

S6(1)(c)-The clause does not define whether people who have the intention to safeguard their property from criminals will work within the framework of the law. In its current form, the clause is too broad and can mean anyone, including vigilantes

It should be a requirement that such neighbourhood watches must work within the framework of the law to prevent vigilante organisations from receiving qualifying for government support.

Accreditation of neighbourhood watches has the effect of creating a reserve private police force that carry firearms and really are able to threaten the safety of citizens without sufficient oversight. Neighbourhood watches are not in the business of oversight, rather, they are armed men (mostly) who are in the business of providing safety to defined members of the community, sometimes at a fee.

While the objects are designed to increase oversight over the provincial police, this section has no business and place in an Act of such a nature.

There should , if that is the intention, be separate legislation which creates neighbourhood watches; stipulates its mandate, structure and what oversight structures should be used to monitor their activities. Ostensibly they perform a policing function and should be subject to the same provisions that members of SAPS and Metro Police are subject to.

S6(2)-Accreditation-The Provincial Minister asks for comment from the police prior to accrediting the neighbourhood watch.

There are defined areas where the police’s role are important:

Firstly identification of members who have criminal records, or is involved in criminality, and secondly, whether the neighbourhood watch is inclined to co-operate with the police.

However, this is not stipulated in the clause as it provides the Provincial Minister with the authority to register and accredit neighbourhood watches

The terms of accreditation are not defined. The role of the police in checking whether criminal elements are part of the neighbourhood watches has been diminished. It is not clear which aspects of they are supposed to comment on.

S6(8)-Accreditation-According to this clause, the Provincial Minister may make available resources, training and funding to accredited watches.

By giving the Provincial Minister the discretion to decide who gets resources, the opportunity arises for political bias and subjective decision making to further the political party objectives of the MEC rather than objective evidence based decisions as to which communities should receive the resources based on actual safety and security threats. It is akin to rewarding political supporters and rather than serve the purpose of supporting communtities to be more secure will inevetibaly increase conflict. This section is designed to further party political purposes rather protecting and securing communtities.

Secondly, neighbourhood watches would also eclipse and de-incentivize CPF’s from working with SAPS in such an arrangement

CPF’s are provided for in the Police Act, not neighbourhood watches. It will create unnecessary tensions and new bureaucracies

There is also no process for members of the public or institutions to object against the inclusion of individuals for accreditation, where such individuals are not fit and proper persons

Section 7, Database and partnerships with community organisations:

S7)Clause 7(1)(c) provides for the Provincial Minister to enter into contracts with entities to develop safety projects.

This section does not indicate how the Department of the Minister will use the partnerships to assist in the objectives of the department. It wide, vague and embarrasing

The provisions of the relevant and applicable national legislation should be taken into account and not just provincial legislation such as the Preferential Procurement Framework Act, the Constitution and the PFMA

There is a potential conflict of interest in the manner in which the clause is phrased as it allows the Minister to provide support (which is not defined), but allows the Minister to enter into a contractual relationship with such organisations for financial gain. This is a conflict of interest

Section 7 (c) the consequence of this section is that it provides the Member of the Provincial Executive Council with possible powers to award financial contracts to organizations. This section has the danger of violating the principles of good governance and in contravention of the PFMA. Tendering processes should not be located with an MEC’s, it is a function to be performed by the administration of the department in line with the PFMA and treasury prescripts. This section again tends to confuse and blur the role of the political office /executive and the administration as well as encroach upon the role of the administration. The intended and/ or unintended consequence of this section is that it will promote party political interests by ensuring the awarding of contracts to organizations supporting the DA’s and MEC’s political agenda.

The section is a also a duplication of Section 17 (b) of the Civilian Secretariat of Police Service Act which already assigns certain functions to the provincial secretariats that includes the promotion of community police relations, establish and promote partnership and manage the enhancement of community safety structures.

The establishment of database on community based organisation does not need legislation in this regard as it is the normal job function of a department to give effect to legislation in promoting community police relations. It should be dealt with via regulations and / or policy i.e. standard operating procedures.

More worrying though is Section 7(2) provides for the Provincial Minister to facilitate the establishment of specialised units in response to specific categories of crime

This is a misnomer because the Provincial Minister does not have the power to determine the structures of the South African Police Services or the Metro Police Services

This is a competency of the National Commissioner of SAPS and it is a national competence. The heading of Section 7 is furthemore misleading referring to “database and partnerships with community organisations”, however, its content (section 7.d) refers to the establishment of specialised units. It seems that this error may be deliberate with the intended purpose of surreptitiously including a clealy unconstitutional section under a different heading. At best it is incompetant drafting.

Section 8, Integrated information System:

Section 8.4 of the Community Safety Bill is unconstitutional encroaching on national governemnts powers functions and competance. It is in conflict with numerous national security legislation as the consequence of this section amounts to provincial legislation of private intelligence gathering. This is not a function of the province and may be in conflict with other security and intelligence legislation and policy. The section is too broad and and vague and illegally and unconstituionally implies that the Department can collect information from any police statioto without defining the information – which may negatively impact on state security and compromising police information that might be used in a court of law.

This section is in violation of Section 209 of the RSA Constitution and relevant regulations on information gathering and intelligence gathering of information.

Section 8 (7 and 8) is also unconstituional as its intention is to encroach upon and duplicate the functions of the national Minister for Policing as it relates to accountability of Private Security Agencies. It is furthmore in conflict with the Private Security Industry Regulation Act of 2001. The PSIRA is a national regulation and report and accounts to the National Minister. The

Section 9, Confidentiality and Disclosure:

This section is at variance with the section on neighbourhood watches as any person can apply for and inspect the register

The register may contain personal information and be in conflict with privacy legislation as well as a myriad of national secuirity legislation

Section 10 – 19, Establishment of Office of Western Cape Provincial Police Ombudsman:

The development of a Police Ombudsperson is in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution (S 205 (6) which makes provision for the Independent police Investigative Directorate (IPID) to investigate complaints against the police.

S205(9) of the Constitution makes provision for the police commissioner to appear before the provincial legislature. Its intention is not to have the Provincial Commissioner report on ongoing basis as the Police Ombudsman provision intends. In its current form, it makes the PC accountable to the provincial Police Ombudsman

This section therefore is an encroachment and duplication of the function of the National Secretariat ito Civilian Secretariat for Police Service Act and it is duplication and violation of the Secretariat functions as well as the IPID. It will therefor if implemented amount to a fruitless and wastefull expenditure by creating another external oversight unit outside the SAPS ( this notwithstanding the oversight units within the SAPS as well) . The IPID is already established and prescribe by national legislation to investigate complaints against the police. Other legal institutions such as the Public Protector amongst others also have the power to investigate complaints against the police. These existing oversight units should rather be strenghthened

The creation of an Ombudsman for the provincial police is recreating the wheel and another level of bureacracy in the name of oversight. As mentioned above currently the Public Protector, IPID, Civilian Secretariat deals with complaints against the police. The creation of this office is superflous and just aimed at extending political control over the police in the Province in the name of oversight.

In addition Section 10.(3) in particular makes the police directly accountable for providing co-operation, access and documents to the Ombudsman. There is currently no provision for the creation of such an office in the Constitution or the Police Act.

S11(7) makes provision for the Ombudsman to be assisted by a person or body whose service the Ombudsman requires ofr the purpose of a particular investigation

This clause is ambigous because it could mean the Ombudsman requires administrative capacity and must then contract such services, or it could mean that the Ombudsman should work in partnership with an individual or body in a particular investigation.

S13-This section makes provision for the Ombudsman to report to the Minister on an annual basis on the activities of the Ombudsman

The reporting of the Ombudsman should be to the Provincial Parliament as it is funded by expenditure appropriated by the Provincial Parliament. Its independence will be compromised and it will be seen as one side if it reports to the Provincial Minister only. This clause contradicts S 14.

S19- Reporting by the Provincial Commissioner

The provisions of this clause provides for the Provincial Commissioner to report and be accountable to the Provincial Minister. This section conflict with the SAPS Act, the Constitution as accountability of the Provincial Commissioner is to the National Commissioner of Police. SAPS is not a private provincial institution that it should report to the Provincial MEC. It has been established nationally and has a national structure. The accountability is to the national commissioner and not a politician.

Furthermore, Section 19 (1) of the Community Safety Bill, which refers to “Mandatory Reporting by the Provincial Commissioner to the Member of the Provincial Executive Council, contravenes and is in conflict with the SAPS Act, which is national legislation already prescribing the reporting by the Provincial Commissioner. This section (19.1) which requires “mandatory” reporting by the Provincial Commissioner to the MEC is also vague and embarrassing as well as illegally and unconstitutionally expanding the powers of the MEC. The RSA Constitution Section 207 (4) and (5) states that the Provincial Commissioner is responsible for policing as prescribed by national legislation (not provincial legislation) and that the Provincial Commissioner must report to the provincial legislature annually.( only)

Furthemore -S19 (2) reporting of deaths by SAPS to MEC by the PC is a duplication of IPID function as the SAPS are required by Law to report deaths in police custody and / as a result of a police officers action to the IPID. In addition Section 19 (6) is furthemore a Constitutional violation of Powers and Functions- The PC is not required to be summoned to answer to the provincial parliament.

Section 20, Loss of confidence in Provincial Commissioner:

Powers of provincial cabinet ito S69(2) of the Provincial Constitution –
provincial Cabinet can require the Provincial Commisioner (PC) to appear before any committees if there is loss of confidence in the PC. According to the Constitution of the RSA, Section 207 (6) action against a provincial commissioner may be implemented in accordance with national legislation, in this case it is the SAPS Act which also clearly state that the matter must be referred by the MEC/ or provincial executive council to the National Minister who may refer the matter to the National Police Commissioner for further investigation.

Section 21, Reporting by executive head of municipal police service:

These functions are already prescribed in the SAPS Act, Chapter 12, 64N and therefore a duplication of legislation. Again in terms of Section 206 of the Constitution, a MEC is responsible for policing assigned to it in terms of national legislation. The Community Safety Bill as a provincial legislation undermines Section 206 of the Constitution.

Section 22, Recording of requests and recommendations:

This section allows the Provincial Minister to keep a record of requests, reports and recommendations to the Provincial Minister, an executive head of a municipal police service and the SAPS Provincial Commissioner

This clause creates a record of accountability from the Provincial Commissioner or the executive head of a municipal police service. The provision of a register to be tabled in the provincial parliament is superfluous because reports of this nature really should go to the national police commissioner. The underlying purpose of this clause is to really build a case against the provincial commissioner when it comes to discipline loosing confidence. It compels the commissioner to send every recommendation and every report to the MEC’s office and such a clause is too wide ranging and will keep the administrative burden on the police very high. In any case, such a clause will not regulate the relationship between the police and the MEC. It will only intensify conflict when certain reports are not received or lost by officials. It is really designed to facilitate structural conflict between the two institutions

Section 23, Policing needs and priorities:

This is a duplication which is already covered in the RSA Constitution Section 206.

This sections allows for the Provincial Minister to report on his /her functions

The title of this section does not reflect the real purpose of this section which really is a report on the performance of the Provincial Minister to the provincial standing committee responsible for community safety. Determining policing needs and priorities is another matter altogether and the SAPS should really have a say in determining the policing needs and priorities together with the communities that they serve. This is principally done through the community police forums that are legislated structures. They have been written out of the equation and should really have the biggest say when it comes to determining what the policing needs for their communities really are.

Section 24, Cooperation in intergovernmental relations:

The MEC can only perform policing functions as prescribed by national legislation and national policy. This is a repetition of Chapter 3 of the RSA Constitution.

Section 25 – 28, Provincial Safety Advisory Committee:

S25- This section which makes provision for the establishment of a Provincial Safety Advisory Committee

The provisions of chapter 11 of the Constitution is meant for the national Minister of Police to be responsible for shaping policing policy and has the political responsibility . The Advisory committee will find itself in a corner because it cannot make and advise on national policing policy which really should be lodged with the Minister. Secondly, at national level there already exists a provision in the Civilian Secretariat for Police Act, a provision for a Reference group of academics and practitioners that advises the National Secretariat.

It is the role of the Civilian Secretariat for Police to function under the direction of the Minister who determines policing policy in terms of S 208 of the Constitution. This is a national competency and the Provincial Safety Advisory Committee is also in conflict with the Secretariat Policy Research Reference Group ito the Civilian Secretariat for Police Act

Chapter 11 of the RSA Constitution refers to the National Minister of police and not to the MEC. The Civilian Secretariat of Police Service makes provision for the appointment of a reference group of academics and practitioners that advises the National Secretariat.

The functions for the Advisory Committee as stipulated in the Provincial Bill is purely an administrative function and a duplication of the work of the department who is responsible for strategies, policies, budgets and annual performance plans. The effect of this provincial advisory committee as per the Bill is that it will duplicate and takeover the functions of the officials in the Department responsible for fulfilling the Secretariat work. This section indicates that the Advisory committee will be responsible for amongst others developing and advising the MEC on strategy of the secretariat as well as the development of APP’s. This is the function of the SMS members in the Provincial Department of Community Safety currently fulfilling the Secretariat Function such as Chief Director and the Director Safety Information and Research, Monitoring and Evaluation etc together with the Director Strategy. This section will make the functions of the officials responsible redundant and a fruitless and wasteful expenditure. It also amounts to a surreptitious and illegal circumvention of the Public Service Act and the Ministerial Handbook for Political Office Bearers which only provides for advisors to Cabinet Ministers and Premiers and not MEC’s

This provision is therefore in conflict with the role of the Civilian Secretariat for Police

Section 29, Awards:

This section which provides for the Provincial Minister to makes awards to community members could create a conflict of interest with the MEC having to issue rewards to community members and could be used politically to marginalise sections of people. This function is therefore not correctly located as it is inappropriate for the MEC to decide the upon the issuing of awards, it creates the space for poliltical biased decision making. Instead it is a function that should be managed by the department of community safety and not the MEC to avoid the political bias and subjectivity in the issuing of awards towards communities or it has the potential to create tension and conflict with an between communities and the department. An awards system must be developed with a proper evidencebased and results driven performance management and assessment process that and is not only unbiased and impartial but is seen to be by communtities as unbiased, objective, non partisan, impartial and integrity based. In its current form the awards system will lose its reputational integrity from the outset as communtities will perceive it to biased and politically motovated.

Section 30, Offences:

This section is unconsitutional as the the provincial MEC cannot regulate offences unless it is prescribe by national legislation.

Section 31, Regulations and Section 32, Delegation:

The functions of the MEC are assigned to it by national legislation – and policy.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion having due regard for our above mentioned concerns the ANC is deeply disturbed that the real intention and spirit of this bill is to create constitutional, legislative and intergovernmental conflict and a crisis to further the DA’s political agenda of opposition for the sake of opposition, rather than to create harmonization between the national, provincial and local spheres of government as it relates to community safety in general and civilian oversight in particular. Secondly that the Bill has been deliberately designed to expand the powers of the MEC to allow the DA to continue its war against community structures and take more centralised control of it by diluting there democratic right to elect members and leaders that will oppose there policy direction-and appoint there own members instead – which is to protect the safety and secuirty interests of the priveleged communtities only and to create conflict within these structures.

5. Reccommendation

That the bill be struck down down as it is:


  •  illegal and unconstitutional in numerous repects.
  • Secondly that the bill will amount to copious amount fruitless and wastefull expenditure due to the consistant duplication of functions.
  • Thirdly that the bill will create intentional and consistent intergovernmental conflict and community conflict.
  • That the intention of the bill is not enhance the safety and security of all the communtities of the Western Cape and in particular the historically black ( african and coloured ) working class and poorer communities but rather to advance the politics of the DA.


Issued by the ANC Western Cape, January 29 2013


Lindiwe Mazibuko’s letter nonsensical – ANC

Office of Chief Whip says DA PL’s defence of FNB not surprising given their common modus operandi


23 January 2012

The Office of the ANC Chief Whip understands that DA parliamentary leader, Lindiwe Mazibuko, has written a letter to President Jacob Zuma ranting about a wide range of issues, which she blames on the President. The President will indeed find Ms Mazibuko’s letter, which contains wild and spurious accusations that cannot be substantiated, extremely difficult to take seriously.

Ms Mazibuko alleges amongst others that the President has failed to intervene in the “tensions” between unions, Implats and the Minister of Mineral Resources, following the mine’s decision to retrench 14000 workers. As the chief advocates of business and the wealthy, it is understandable that the DA will feel aggrieved by the criticism the government, ANC, unions and the broader society directed at Implats’ decision to condemn thousands into poverty without following proper consultative processes.

When it comes to issues of exploitation of workers and general labour conditions, the DA will rather blame the poor workers for their sufferings while maintaining deafening silence on the bosses. It is the same posture its Western Cape government took in the De Doorns farms strike, where Premier Helen Zille blamed the workers from the comfort of her air-conditioned offices, rather than intervene on the ground to resolve the impasse. Rather than being outraged at Implats’ unilateral action to send more people to the unemployment queue, Ms Mazibuko directs her criticism at those who are tirelessly working to ensure sanity prevails and thousands of jobs are saved.

The Office of the Chief Whip is satisfied with the Minister’s intervention in the Implats situation.

The defence of the FNB by Ms Mazibuko is also unsurprising, given the striking similarities between the DA’s political rhetoric and the bank’s latest political campaign. The modus operandi of propagating defamatory claims, untested and unsubstantiated allegations is what makes it difficult for us to distinguish between this banking institution and the DA. It is unfortunate that Ms Mazibuko thinks it is acceptable for a child to publicly call an elder “brainless”. Insults do not build, but diminish a climate for constructive, frank and open public discourse. They polarise our society, poison social relations and derail our progress as a nation.

While Ms Mazibuko feels obligated to blindly defend everything business does, she should be ashamed that she condones usage of children as the face of such a dirty political gimmick.

We have no interest in repeating the ANC’s clarifications on the wild allegations published in the media, which Ms Mazibuko parroted in her letter. We therefore hope that the President will ignore her nonsensical letter with the contempt it deserves.

Statement issued by the Office of the ANC Chief Whip, January 23 2013


Treasury ultimatum may ‘close’ old town

Cape Town – Political infighting between the ANC and the DA in Swellendam may lead to the municipality effectively closing its doors – if the national Treasury stops funding it.

The country’s second-oldest town stands to lose 15 percent or R22 million of its current R146-million budget if the national government calls a halt to all transfers.

On Monday, the mayor warned that the municipality would not be able to deliver water, electricity, maintain its sewers and build houses for the poor if its funding were to dry up.

The municipality was reduced to chaos last year when angry residents blocked the N2 and looted shops over political infighting at the council and poor service delivery.

The DA controls the municipality in a coalition with the ACDP, which has the deciding vote.

Both the ANC and the DA have four seats. Last year the coalition almost fell apart when ACDP councillor Julian Matthysen, who had been fired from his party, tried to help the ANC unseat the DA. The DA went to court to reaffirm its control of the council.

Chaos in Swellendam led to Co-operative Governance Minister Richard Baloyi stepping in. He appointed officials from his Pretoria office, along with a provincial government administrator, Graham Paulse, to help with the running of the town.

The national Treasury dealt a blow to Swellendam in the past week when it said it would stop all transfers if the municipality did not get its books in order.

“If the Treasury continues to takes this approach with Swellendam, we will have to close our doors pretty soon,” said Swellendam mayor Nicholas Myburgh.


He admitted that the municipality could not get its finances in order because it did not have enough people in the finance department.

“We couldn’t appoint the correct people because of the situation in the council. We just couldn’t agree,” he said.

ANC councillor John Nortje said the responsibility lay at the feet of the DA and Myburgh. “It’s all their mistake. Myburgh didn’t attend to his responsibilities and the municipality has too many consultants,” said Nortje.

The municipality has appointed one consultant to help with its finances.

Swellendam still has not submitted its annual financial statements for the past year to the auditor-general.

Myburgh said the municipality would have to halt its R30m upgrade of its sewer works if funding dried up.

“This will also affect the building of 600 houses for the poor. If we can’t expand our sewer network to these areas, we can’t build these houses,” he said.

Myburgh said the municipality could still pay its creditors but it did have cash flow problems.

“We have approached private banks to help fund our capital projects, but they, too, are unwilling to help until our financial statements are up to date,” said Myburgh.

Western Cape Local Government MEC Anton Bredell said yesterday his officials went to Swellendam last week to look at the town’s financial statements.

“We will meet on Wednesday (tomorrow) to see how we can implement a turnaround strategy and convince the national Treasury not to withhold its funds. Our provincial treasury is already talking to national government about this and setting up meetings,” said Bredell.

“Kannaland had similar problems and we were able to find a solution. We are working to solve the problems before the next transfer.”

The national Treasury is scheduled to make the next transfer to Swellendam in March. Myburgh said the municipality would be able to turn its finances around in the next seven months if it had the qualified staff and support.


DA ‘will fight transfer of hospitals’

groote schuur hospital

Groote Schuur Hospital.

Cape Town – The DA provincial government will not relinquish control of Groote Schuur and Tygerberg hospitals to the national Health Department without a fight, Health MEC Theuns Botha says.

“It will be unconstitutional to nationalise it and we will resist it,” he said on Monday.

Botha was approached for comment after Western Cape Health Department head Professor Craig Househam had told Business Day the national department had neither the capacity nor the skills to run the two hospitals from Pretoria.

Househam was interviewed on Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi’s plan to place 10 academic hospitals under national control.

“I firmly believe this decision, in the current context is a mistake. Groote Schuur and Tygerberg are not perfect, but in the South African context they are well managed. Their CEOs are competent and well qualified and they play a very important part in a health system focused at local level,” Business Day quoted Househam as saying.

Botha said he was in full support of Househam who spoke on behalf of the Western Cape Health Department.

“These two hospitals are provincial assets, are run provincially and they render a quality service. There is no reason to put them in a basket with other hospitals that are poorly run,” he said.

The problem of poorly managed hospitals would remain unsolved as long as proper control was missing and health MECs and provincial governments lacked political responsibility, Botha said.

“We take responsibility and that is why we make a difference. It is not a magic formula. The national department could not muster a clean audit, but now wants to take control of hospitals in a province where we received a clean audit,” said Botha.

In the Business Day article on Monday Motsoaledi said he knew the Western Cape resented national control of Tygerberg and Groote Schuur.

“The problem with the Western Cape is they regard themselves as a different country because they are under the DA,” the paper quoted him as saying.

The province had also been opposed to the National Health Insurance, but later agreed to it being piloted, Motsoaledi added.

“It’s opposed to training doctors in Cuba, which is an indictment. There are poor kids in Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain who would benefit from the programme,” Motsoaledi told Business Day.

Said Botha: “He talks about the DA. I can say some things about ANC-controlled health departments, but I’m disappointed he makes such political remarks.

“What we do has got to do with good governance. The health minister decided to appoint chief executive officers at central hospitals everywhere in the country except in the Western Cape and this proves the Western Cape hospitals are well managed.”

Cape Times