De Lille slams anti-gay slur by ANC councillor in Cape Town

iol news pic parliament fashion 3

Cape Town Mayor Patricia De Lille at the opening of Parliament.

Cape Town – An ANC city councillor has been taken to task for describing Cape Town as a “moffie city”.

The remarks were reportedly made by Abdulhamied Gabier in Wedmesday’s sitting at the council chambers.

Mayor Patricia de Lille said the councillor had laid into Cape Town with a string of insults, among them the anti-gay slur.

“He was so homophobic and so insulting. I stood up and told the Speaker we cannot allow that language in the house, it’s unconstitutional.”

De Lille said she did not know what had prompted the outburst, as it “was not even relevant to the debate”.

On Twitter, DA councillor Dave Bryant reported: “(The) mayor spoke up and took him (Gabier) to task for homophobic statements and (the) ANC caucus just laughed. What a classy bunch.”


ANC caucus leader Tony Ehrenreich said: “Obviously the ANC does not endorse statements like that, and are completely opposed to such terms.”

Contacted today, Gabier said, somewhat confusingly: “You must ask the mayor why she is angry.” He then hung up.

Cape Argus



DA achieves steady growth in by-elections – Mmusi Maimane

Party’s support in Magareng grows to 38.8%, up from 7.5% in 2009

By-election results show steady DA growth

The DA made significant inroads in by-elections held yesterday. We contested four wards across the country, holding all three previously DA wards with increased majorities. In an ANC-held ward we contested in Magareng in the Northern Cape we showed strong growth, increasing our support fivefold since 2009.

Here are the results in the four wards the DA contested:

Magareng (ward 4):


2009 7.50% 63%

2011 27.50% 62%

2013 38.80% 58%

Stellenbosch (ward 22):


2009 N/A N/A

2011 95.60% 1.43%

2013 98.90% 0.34%

Merafong City (ward 28):


2009 N/A N/A

2011 62.70% 32%

2013 67.30% 32%

Emalahleni (ward 34):


2009 N/A N/A

2011 72.70% 25.50%

2013 96.70% did not contest

The wards in Stellenbosch, Merafong City and Emalahleni were all created after 2009.

The result in Magareng is particularly significant since it shows that the DA is growing in areas that were once considered ANC strongholds.

We are pleased with these results. The DA continues to grow in all communities across South Africa.

Statement issued by Mmusi Maimane, DA National Spokesperson, March 7 2013

The end of non-racialism?

Dave Steward says ANC rhetoric consistently characterises whites as “the other”

Dave Steward

In his recent address to the Cape Town Press Club Hlumelo Biko pointed to the increasing tendency within the ANC to “obectivise”, to “other” and to “border” non-black communities – and particularly whites. He warned that this process was not good news for those who are being objectivised.




What did he mean?

A speech by Jeff Radebe last month in Parliament provides some pointers regarding the manner in which the Government is ramping up its rhetoric. In a relatively short address, he referred no fewer than seven times to the depredations of the past –


  • to “apartheid colonialism”;
  • to “the struggle against colonialism and apartheid”;
  • to “the forces of colonialism and later of apartheid, on the one side, arrayed …against the forces of freedom and democracy on the other side;”
  •  to ” … the heroic stance by the United Nations when It declared apartheid a crime against humanity and a threat to world peace;”
  • to “…the untold suffering, strife and racial hatred sowed by apartheid…”; and
  • to “…the poverty trap and vicious cycle of inequality perpetrated by the legacy of apartheid and colonialism…”


Such references pepper most policy statements made by the ANC. Whatever their historic merit – or lack of merit – it would be surprising if they do not stir up some degree of racial animosity – or at the very least – reinforce perceptions of white moral inferiority and black entitlement. Inevitably they fuel demands for restitution – particularly of land – which most black South Africans firmly believe was stolen from their ancestors.

The message characterises whites as “the other” and places them beyond the border of “us” because they are presented as being either directly responsible for “apartheid colonialism” – or as being its present day heirs and beneficiaries. Whites are indelibly tarnished by the past – while blacks are identified with the forces of freedom and democracy. The “legacy of apartheid and colonialism” is routinely identified as the root cause of most of South Africa’s problems – and particularly of the triple crisis of poverty, unemployment and inequality.

Increasing use is made of the term “apartheid colonialism” – implying that whites are transient alien interlopers. For example, the Green Paper on Land Reform proclaims that “all anti-colonial struggles are at the core about two things, repossession of lost land and restoring the centrality of indigenous culture” (i.e. placing blacks at the centre and “bordering” and “othering” minorities at the periphery).

The message continues that, in the second phase of national transition, the time has now arrived to take action against these vestiges of apartheid and colonialism.

All this raises questions about the degree to which non-racialism is still a core value of our new society, of our government and of the ruling alliance.

It is a question that was recently addressed by the Ahmed Kathrada Foundation in a study of racial perceptions in a number of ANC branches in Guateng. The findings revealed “a growing sense of isolation and fracture among non-African constituencies” which could have “profound implications for the party’s (the ANC’s) ‘identity’ as a non-racial party.”

Although participants in the survey noted that the ANC “theoretically supports the ideal of non-racialism” they felt that there were “significant problems with race relations within the ANC, at all levels” – particularly in branches with strong minority membership – such as Eldorado Park, Sandton and Lenasia. Among the problems were perceptions of racism and the sense that non-Africans were excluded from leadership positions.

The authors of the study go on to discuss the ANC doctrine that the institutional racism of “colonialism of a special type” can be overcome only through the “empowerment of blacks in general and Africans in particular”. This will require “the radical restructuring of key aspects of the economy so as to destroy the material basis of the white racist power structure.” This process – which lies at the core of the ANC’s National Democratic Revolution – is described by Firoz Cachalia as “anti-racist-racism”. According to Pallo Jordan

“The movement adopted as policy the conscious and deliberate re-racialisation of South Africa by undertaking a host of measures, among which are affirmative action, to ensure that the results of decades of systematic discrimination and denial of job opportunities are reversed. In other words, the purpose of affirmative action is to create circumstances in which affirmative action will no longer be necessary.”

The ANC’s updated 2012 Strategy and Tactics document states that “the need for such affirmative action will decline in the same measure as all centres of power and influence and other critical spheres of social endeavour become broadly representative of the country’s demographics. In the process, all inequalities that may persist or arise need to be addressed.”

The “re-racialisation” of South Africa is gathering pace. The government rigidly allocates posts in the public service according to demographics – down to the first decimal point – regardless of merit or objective circumstances. Coloured employees of the Department of Correctional Services in the Western Cape are informed that they will not be promoted – because they have exceeded their national racial quota of 8.8%. 1 500 white members of the SAPS have been refused promotion to vacant officers posts because they have exceeded their 9% quota. Late last year Minister Rob Davies said that demographic representivity should also be applied to the private sector: “We need to make sure that in the country’s economy, control, ownership and leadership are reflective of the demographics of the society in the same way the political space does. ”

What we are experiencing is racial social engineering on a Verwoerdian scale, where once again, the course of South Africans’ lives is being determined by their race and not by individual merit. Because it will take generations to achieve broad demographic representivity in all centres of power and influence minority communities can expect to be subjected to “anti-racist racism” for the indefinite future. For all intents and purposes South Africa is no longer a non-racial society.

The “re-racialistion” of South Africa is the antithesis of the constitutional values of human dignity, equality and on-racialism on which our new society has been based. It contravenes South Africa’s international treaty obligations – and it will certainly destroy any hope of national unity. Without national unity we will have little chance of successfully implementing the National Development Plan or of addressing the many challenges that confront us – including the pressing need for a rational and workable transformation process.

Dave Steward is Executive Director of the FW de Klerk Foundation

ANC in Cape Town fails to support R472m tax-break for City’s poor – Ivan Meyer -DA WCape leader says Marius Fransman should apologise for his party’s shameful politicking.

DA WCape leader says Marius Fransman should apologise for his party’s shameful politicking


Fransman must apologize for rejection of R472m tax-break for City’s poor

Marius Fransman, ANC Western Cape Chair, needs to explain to his supporters why the ANC abstained from voting in the City of Cape Town‘s council on a decision to give poor residents a R472 million tax break.

The DA-led council adopted a majority recommendation to write off the interest on the arrears for properties with a municipal valuation of R300 000 or less.

Despite the ANC’s unwillingness to vote on the recommendation, council adopted it and the total amount of charges to be written off for qualifying poor residents amounts to R472 million.

In her State of the Province Address last week, the Premier, Helen Zille, stated that 76% of the annual budget of the DA led Western Cape government is directed towards opening opportunities for people in poor communities.

Clearly the DA puts its money where its mouth is. Unlike the ANC in this province that constantly claims to have the best interest of the poor at heart but then refuses to support a recommendation that does just that!

Mr Fransman must publically apologize to poor residents of Cape Town for this shameful politicking by the ANC.

One of the greatest challenges in the Western Cape is the alleviation of poverty.

The DA believes that every citizen of the Western Cape should have the freedom to improve their lives and break the cycle of poverty.

This can only be achieved through real and tangible initiatives like the one before council yesterday and not through political grandstanding and empty promises.

Statement issued by Ivan Meyer, Leader of the DA in the Western Cape, February 28 2013


Why we reject the Community Safety Bill – ANC WCape

Songezo Mjongile says bill aimed at creating constitutional and inter-governmental conflict



1. Executive Summary

On behalf of the African National Congress Western Cape, after careful consideration and thorough analysis of the Western Cape Community Safety Bill we hereby wish to place on record our ( ANC Western Cape) objection to key sections of the Western Cape Community Safety Bill ( hereafter referred to as the Bill). This includes but is not limited to:

That the Bill is unconstitutional in both letter and spirit in many respects in that the bill seeks to undermine Section 203 and 206 of the South African Constitution Act 108 of 1996 ( hereafter referred to as the Constitution) read together with Schedule 4 and 5 of the Constitution which sets out clearly and specifically the powers and functions of the different spheres of government .

Furthermore, that the bill in certain areas is in direct conflict with the Civilan Secretariat For Police Act 2 of 2011 which specifically outlines the powers and functions of the National and Provincial Secretariats for Safety and Security as it relates to civilian oversight as well as the SAPS Act amongst others.

In this regard it is our understanding that the bill in its current form seeks to encroach upon and at times duplicate the powers and functions of the National Secretariat and the IPID as it relates to civilian oversight amongst others.

Furthemore that the intention of the bill is to unconstitutionally,illegally and surreptitiously expand the powers of the Provincial MEC of Community Safety and the Provincial Cabinet.

Section 206 of the Constitution of the RSA is clear that a member of the provincial executive is responsible for policing functions assigned to it ito national legislation and national policy. The Western Cape Community Safety Bill contravenes the Constitution of RSA, since the province intends to assign powers to the MEC for policing functions through provincial legislation.

This encroachment is not only unconstitutional but it will moreover create inherent constitutional, legislative and intergovernmental conflict and tension as well as the possible duplication of functions. In addition it may have by implication ( as a result of the duplication of functions) the unintended consequences of inefficient, fruitless and wasteful expenditure.

In this regard the establishment of the Office of the Provincial Ombudsman as well as the Provincial Advisory Committee to the MEC for Community Safety are some examples of structures to be established that will amount to duplication of functions and a fruitless and wasteful expenditure. As regards the Ombudsmen’s Office there are already numerous existing structures and institutions that have been established many years ago which are already fulfilling these functions including the IPID and the Public Protector.

Furthermore, the bill has the unintended / perhaps intended consequences of curtailling communities democratic participation within community structures such as CPF’s by diluting its electoral process of CPF’ members. For example S5 of the Bill gives the MEC power to appoint CPF members, indicating once again the DA governments disdain for democratic participation of our communities in general and the poorer african and coloured communities in particular.

We have no doubt that this deeply disturbing trend which permeates much of the bill is deliberately designed to curtail the powers of communities who disagree with the policy direction of the department and the DA in particular as it relates to safety and security. It furthemore is evidence of a dangerous pattern that is emerging of a DA government that is intent on politicising the issue of oversight and community safety by bringing in DA deployees to take over the work of both communities and the officials of the Department. Section 25-28 which provides for the establishment of a provincial advisory committee in simpler terms advisors to the MEC is further evidence of this.

The bill also seeks to create a provincial intelligence gathering and analysis structure in violation and conflict with national legislation and policy as it relates to security and information and without taking into account the risks and unintended consequences as it relates to National Security.

Finally, it is our view that many other sections of the Bill as it relates to the broader functions of the Department of Community Safety other than civilian oversight need not be legislated. The current gaps, challenges and weaknesses that the bill is intending to address can be adequately addressed through policy guidelines and / or prescripts and / or standard operating procedure given that the current constitutional and legislative framework is sufficiently clear in respect of the the existing functions of Provincial Departments of Community Safety.

In conclusion having due regard for our above mentioned concerns the ANC is deeply disturbed that the real intention and spirit of this bill may be to create constitutional, legislative and intergovernmental conflict and a crisis to further the DA’s political agenda of opposition for the sake of opposition, rather than to create harmonization between the national, provincial and local spheres of government as it relates to community safety in general and civilian oversight in particular as well as to politicise the issue of safety in our province.

2. Introduction

Section 40 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa state that in the Republic, government is constituted as national, provincial and local spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. The RSA Constitution further states that all spheres of government must adhere to this section of the Constitution and must conduct their activities within parameters of Chapter 3 of the Constitution, which provides 8 principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations and they are quoted as follows:

Section 41(1)(a-h):

(I) All spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must preserve

(a) the peace, national unity and the indivisibility of the Republic;

(b) secure thew ell-being of the peopleo f the Republic;

(c) provide effective, transparent, accountable and coherent government for the

Republic as a whole;

(d) be loyal to the Constitution, the Republic and its people;

(e) respect the constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in the other spheres;

(f) not assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of

the Constitution;

(g) exercise.; their powers and perform their functions in a manner that does not

encroach on the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere; and

(h) co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith.

Section 41 (1)(d, e and f) requires spheres of government to be loyal to the Constitution; respect the Constitutional status, restitutions, powers and function of government in the other spheres and not assume any power orfunction except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution. The Western Cape Provincial Government’s Community Safety Bill goes against the principles of Section 41 (1) of the Constitution of RSA. It does not respect the Constitutional status, powers and functions of government and it assumes powers not conferred upon it in terms of the Constitution of RSA.

Section 206 and Section 208 of the RSA Constitution gives clear powers to the National Minister in terms policing and clearly describe what the National Minister and a Member of the Provincial Executive Council may do in terms of civilian oversight of the police. Both the SAPS Act and a Civilian Secretariat for Police Act was legislated to give effect to the Constitutional principles which clearly spells-out the role and functions of National Government and Provincial Government with regard to policing and the oversight of policing. In this regard the Community Safety Bill is unnecessary, a duplication of current legislations in place and a waste of state resources.

3. Issues in the Western Cape Community Safety Bill

Section 2, Purpose of Act:

This is duplication of the Constitution of the RSA, Section 206(1), (3), (4), (5) and (9) and 207 (5) and (6). For these sections of the Constitution, a SAPS Act and Civilian Secretariat for Police Act was legislated and is in existence, which clearly spell-out the functions of the National Minister, Members of Provincial Executive Councils and the functions of Civilian Secretariats.

Section 3, Functions of Provincial Minister:

S 3(c)

Policing policy is determined by the SAPS and cannot be subjected to the oversight of the Provincial MEC. In any case, the MEC plays a role in shaping the policy in terms of S206

In terms of the provision, the clause may be too wide ranging because the MEC cannot claim powers that is not allocated to them in terms of the Constitution


The MEC should not be recording complaints against the police as one of his functions. The IPID and Secretariat are mandated to do this.

The MEC cannot through this legislation take over the function of a complaints regulating body such as the IPID and Secretariat. It conflicts with established legislation

This section is a duplication of Section 2 as well as conferring extra powers to the Member of the Provincial Executive Council reponsible for policing encroaching on the Constitutional powers of the National Minister.

In addition, the explanation presented in Section 3 of the Western Cape Community Safety Bill is typically defined as a job description for the Provincial Member of the Executive Council responsible for Community Safety and a performance agreement with the Premier of the Western Cape Province.

This Section furthemore contravenes Section 206 (1) of the Constitution of RSA, which clearly state that National policing is the responsibility of the National Minister and only the National Minister can determine national policing policy after consulting with provincial governments.

This Section furthemore contravenes Section 208 of the Constitution of the RSA, which state that a Civilian Secretariat for Police Service must be established by national legislation to function under the direction of the Cabinet Member responsible for policing. However and in contrast, this Section of the Western Cape Community Safety Bill undermines Section 208 of the Constitution of the RSA and confers the Constitutional powers of the Cabinet Member responsible for policing to the Member of the Provincial Executive Council.

The Constitution is clear ito Section 206 and 208 re the powers vested in NAT MIN.

Section 4, Monitoring, oversight and assessment of policing:

In terms of Section 206 (4) of the Constitution of the RSA, a provincial executive is responsible for policing functions assigned to it in terms of national legislation and national policing policy.

The functions of monitoring and oversight of policing is already assigned to the provincial executive in terms of the national legislations namely the SAPS Act and the Civilian Secretariat for Police Act, therefore the Western Cape Community Safety Bill undermines the national legislation and the powers invested to the National Minister and prescribed by the RSA Constitution.

Chapter 2, Section 3 of the SAPS Act prescribes the functions of the secretariat, which is to evaluate the SAPS and in the same chapter, Section 3 (3) says that only the National Minister may make regulations re the establishment and functioning of secretariats and regulations re provincial secretariats in consultation with the executive co-ordinating committee.

Section 4.1 of the Community Safety Bill encroaches and expands the powers of Monitoring and Oversight e of the MEC and therefore is in violation Section 206 and 208 of the Constitution, the SAPS Act and the Civilian Secretariat of Police Service Act. The Civilian Secretariat for Police Service Act, Section 17 (1) (2) prescribes the functions of provincial secretariats. The Community Safety Bill one again undermines and contravenes the SAPS Act and the Civilian Secretariat for Police service Act.

S4(2)& (3)- The provincial Minister should not be allowed to authorise anyone, other than a staff member to perform the functions as proposed in S 4(1) of the Bill

Only employees of the Department should be authorised to interact and work with SAPS for security purposes, otherwise it compromises the security agreements and arrangements with respect to information security.

Section 5, Directives for establishment of community police forums and boards:

S5 (1) Currently clause 18(2) of the SAPS Act notes that the establishment of community police forums do not preclude the police from liaising with any structure other than CPFs

S5(3) places no obligation the Department of Community Safety to make available funding , training and resources. This clause should be reconsidered as CPF’s cannot function without such resources and allows the Department to play politics as to who it supports or not. There should be no discretion and the Department should be obligated to provide such support.

The establishment of Community Police Forums and Community Police Boards are prescribed in the SAPS Act, Chapter 7, (ss 19 – 21). The Community Safety Bill once again duplicates the SAPS Act and undermines the powers of the National Minister in terms creating national regulations and national policy as indicated in Section 206 of the Constitution. More worrying though is that the consequence of this section of the Community Safety Bill is that it will dilute the principles of democratic participation of communities in electing its CPF leadership as CPF members can now also be appointed rather than elected undermining the principles of democracy within CPF’s.

This section is further evidence of the DA lead provincial government’s war on community structures and community participation as the intention is to ensure the withering away of community participation and democratic principles in legislated community structures.

Section 5.2.&3 of the Community Safety Bill re the evaluation and support of CPFs does not need to be legislated (only national can legislate). This is a policy matter that cab be and is already dealt with via Provincial Cabinet Resolution (there is already a Provincial Cabinet Resolution re support and funding to CPFs and other organizations – 1999). Any updates and amendments can be dealt with via an amendment to the resolution.

Section 6, Accreditation of and support to neighbourhood watches:

The section does not need legislation since the provincial executive can only perform policing functions assigned to it by national legislation. The province should rather focus on policy for neighbourhood watches through a provincial cabinet resolution. Having noted the above there remains a number of concerns iro the drafting of this section which includes but is not limited to :

S6(1)(c)-The clause does not define whether people who have the intention to safeguard their property from criminals will work within the framework of the law. In its current form, the clause is too broad and can mean anyone, including vigilantes

It should be a requirement that such neighbourhood watches must work within the framework of the law to prevent vigilante organisations from receiving qualifying for government support.

Accreditation of neighbourhood watches has the effect of creating a reserve private police force that carry firearms and really are able to threaten the safety of citizens without sufficient oversight. Neighbourhood watches are not in the business of oversight, rather, they are armed men (mostly) who are in the business of providing safety to defined members of the community, sometimes at a fee.

While the objects are designed to increase oversight over the provincial police, this section has no business and place in an Act of such a nature.

There should , if that is the intention, be separate legislation which creates neighbourhood watches; stipulates its mandate, structure and what oversight structures should be used to monitor their activities. Ostensibly they perform a policing function and should be subject to the same provisions that members of SAPS and Metro Police are subject to.

S6(2)-Accreditation-The Provincial Minister asks for comment from the police prior to accrediting the neighbourhood watch.

There are defined areas where the police’s role are important:

Firstly identification of members who have criminal records, or is involved in criminality, and secondly, whether the neighbourhood watch is inclined to co-operate with the police.

However, this is not stipulated in the clause as it provides the Provincial Minister with the authority to register and accredit neighbourhood watches

The terms of accreditation are not defined. The role of the police in checking whether criminal elements are part of the neighbourhood watches has been diminished. It is not clear which aspects of they are supposed to comment on.

S6(8)-Accreditation-According to this clause, the Provincial Minister may make available resources, training and funding to accredited watches.

By giving the Provincial Minister the discretion to decide who gets resources, the opportunity arises for political bias and subjective decision making to further the political party objectives of the MEC rather than objective evidence based decisions as to which communities should receive the resources based on actual safety and security threats. It is akin to rewarding political supporters and rather than serve the purpose of supporting communtities to be more secure will inevetibaly increase conflict. This section is designed to further party political purposes rather protecting and securing communtities.

Secondly, neighbourhood watches would also eclipse and de-incentivize CPF’s from working with SAPS in such an arrangement

CPF’s are provided for in the Police Act, not neighbourhood watches. It will create unnecessary tensions and new bureaucracies

There is also no process for members of the public or institutions to object against the inclusion of individuals for accreditation, where such individuals are not fit and proper persons

Section 7, Database and partnerships with community organisations:

S7)Clause 7(1)(c) provides for the Provincial Minister to enter into contracts with entities to develop safety projects.

This section does not indicate how the Department of the Minister will use the partnerships to assist in the objectives of the department. It wide, vague and embarrasing

The provisions of the relevant and applicable national legislation should be taken into account and not just provincial legislation such as the Preferential Procurement Framework Act, the Constitution and the PFMA

There is a potential conflict of interest in the manner in which the clause is phrased as it allows the Minister to provide support (which is not defined), but allows the Minister to enter into a contractual relationship with such organisations for financial gain. This is a conflict of interest

Section 7 (c) the consequence of this section is that it provides the Member of the Provincial Executive Council with possible powers to award financial contracts to organizations. This section has the danger of violating the principles of good governance and in contravention of the PFMA. Tendering processes should not be located with an MEC’s, it is a function to be performed by the administration of the department in line with the PFMA and treasury prescripts. This section again tends to confuse and blur the role of the political office /executive and the administration as well as encroach upon the role of the administration. The intended and/ or unintended consequence of this section is that it will promote party political interests by ensuring the awarding of contracts to organizations supporting the DA’s and MEC’s political agenda.

The section is a also a duplication of Section 17 (b) of the Civilian Secretariat of Police Service Act which already assigns certain functions to the provincial secretariats that includes the promotion of community police relations, establish and promote partnership and manage the enhancement of community safety structures.

The establishment of database on community based organisation does not need legislation in this regard as it is the normal job function of a department to give effect to legislation in promoting community police relations. It should be dealt with via regulations and / or policy i.e. standard operating procedures.

More worrying though is Section 7(2) provides for the Provincial Minister to facilitate the establishment of specialised units in response to specific categories of crime

This is a misnomer because the Provincial Minister does not have the power to determine the structures of the South African Police Services or the Metro Police Services

This is a competency of the National Commissioner of SAPS and it is a national competence. The heading of Section 7 is furthemore misleading referring to “database and partnerships with community organisations”, however, its content (section 7.d) refers to the establishment of specialised units. It seems that this error may be deliberate with the intended purpose of surreptitiously including a clealy unconstitutional section under a different heading. At best it is incompetant drafting.

Section 8, Integrated information System:

Section 8.4 of the Community Safety Bill is unconstitutional encroaching on national governemnts powers functions and competance. It is in conflict with numerous national security legislation as the consequence of this section amounts to provincial legislation of private intelligence gathering. This is not a function of the province and may be in conflict with other security and intelligence legislation and policy. The section is too broad and and vague and illegally and unconstituionally implies that the Department can collect information from any police statioto without defining the information – which may negatively impact on state security and compromising police information that might be used in a court of law.

This section is in violation of Section 209 of the RSA Constitution and relevant regulations on information gathering and intelligence gathering of information.

Section 8 (7 and 8) is also unconstituional as its intention is to encroach upon and duplicate the functions of the national Minister for Policing as it relates to accountability of Private Security Agencies. It is furthmore in conflict with the Private Security Industry Regulation Act of 2001. The PSIRA is a national regulation and report and accounts to the National Minister. The

Section 9, Confidentiality and Disclosure:

This section is at variance with the section on neighbourhood watches as any person can apply for and inspect the register

The register may contain personal information and be in conflict with privacy legislation as well as a myriad of national secuirity legislation

Section 10 – 19, Establishment of Office of Western Cape Provincial Police Ombudsman:

The development of a Police Ombudsperson is in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution (S 205 (6) which makes provision for the Independent police Investigative Directorate (IPID) to investigate complaints against the police.

S205(9) of the Constitution makes provision for the police commissioner to appear before the provincial legislature. Its intention is not to have the Provincial Commissioner report on ongoing basis as the Police Ombudsman provision intends. In its current form, it makes the PC accountable to the provincial Police Ombudsman

This section therefore is an encroachment and duplication of the function of the National Secretariat ito Civilian Secretariat for Police Service Act and it is duplication and violation of the Secretariat functions as well as the IPID. It will therefor if implemented amount to a fruitless and wastefull expenditure by creating another external oversight unit outside the SAPS ( this notwithstanding the oversight units within the SAPS as well) . The IPID is already established and prescribe by national legislation to investigate complaints against the police. Other legal institutions such as the Public Protector amongst others also have the power to investigate complaints against the police. These existing oversight units should rather be strenghthened

The creation of an Ombudsman for the provincial police is recreating the wheel and another level of bureacracy in the name of oversight. As mentioned above currently the Public Protector, IPID, Civilian Secretariat deals with complaints against the police. The creation of this office is superflous and just aimed at extending political control over the police in the Province in the name of oversight.

In addition Section 10.(3) in particular makes the police directly accountable for providing co-operation, access and documents to the Ombudsman. There is currently no provision for the creation of such an office in the Constitution or the Police Act.

S11(7) makes provision for the Ombudsman to be assisted by a person or body whose service the Ombudsman requires ofr the purpose of a particular investigation

This clause is ambigous because it could mean the Ombudsman requires administrative capacity and must then contract such services, or it could mean that the Ombudsman should work in partnership with an individual or body in a particular investigation.

S13-This section makes provision for the Ombudsman to report to the Minister on an annual basis on the activities of the Ombudsman

The reporting of the Ombudsman should be to the Provincial Parliament as it is funded by expenditure appropriated by the Provincial Parliament. Its independence will be compromised and it will be seen as one side if it reports to the Provincial Minister only. This clause contradicts S 14.

S19- Reporting by the Provincial Commissioner

The provisions of this clause provides for the Provincial Commissioner to report and be accountable to the Provincial Minister. This section conflict with the SAPS Act, the Constitution as accountability of the Provincial Commissioner is to the National Commissioner of Police. SAPS is not a private provincial institution that it should report to the Provincial MEC. It has been established nationally and has a national structure. The accountability is to the national commissioner and not a politician.

Furthermore, Section 19 (1) of the Community Safety Bill, which refers to “Mandatory Reporting by the Provincial Commissioner to the Member of the Provincial Executive Council, contravenes and is in conflict with the SAPS Act, which is national legislation already prescribing the reporting by the Provincial Commissioner. This section (19.1) which requires “mandatory” reporting by the Provincial Commissioner to the MEC is also vague and embarrassing as well as illegally and unconstitutionally expanding the powers of the MEC. The RSA Constitution Section 207 (4) and (5) states that the Provincial Commissioner is responsible for policing as prescribed by national legislation (not provincial legislation) and that the Provincial Commissioner must report to the provincial legislature annually.( only)

Furthemore -S19 (2) reporting of deaths by SAPS to MEC by the PC is a duplication of IPID function as the SAPS are required by Law to report deaths in police custody and / as a result of a police officers action to the IPID. In addition Section 19 (6) is furthemore a Constitutional violation of Powers and Functions- The PC is not required to be summoned to answer to the provincial parliament.

Section 20, Loss of confidence in Provincial Commissioner:

Powers of provincial cabinet ito S69(2) of the Provincial Constitution –
provincial Cabinet can require the Provincial Commisioner (PC) to appear before any committees if there is loss of confidence in the PC. According to the Constitution of the RSA, Section 207 (6) action against a provincial commissioner may be implemented in accordance with national legislation, in this case it is the SAPS Act which also clearly state that the matter must be referred by the MEC/ or provincial executive council to the National Minister who may refer the matter to the National Police Commissioner for further investigation.

Section 21, Reporting by executive head of municipal police service:

These functions are already prescribed in the SAPS Act, Chapter 12, 64N and therefore a duplication of legislation. Again in terms of Section 206 of the Constitution, a MEC is responsible for policing assigned to it in terms of national legislation. The Community Safety Bill as a provincial legislation undermines Section 206 of the Constitution.

Section 22, Recording of requests and recommendations:

This section allows the Provincial Minister to keep a record of requests, reports and recommendations to the Provincial Minister, an executive head of a municipal police service and the SAPS Provincial Commissioner

This clause creates a record of accountability from the Provincial Commissioner or the executive head of a municipal police service. The provision of a register to be tabled in the provincial parliament is superfluous because reports of this nature really should go to the national police commissioner. The underlying purpose of this clause is to really build a case against the provincial commissioner when it comes to discipline loosing confidence. It compels the commissioner to send every recommendation and every report to the MEC’s office and such a clause is too wide ranging and will keep the administrative burden on the police very high. In any case, such a clause will not regulate the relationship between the police and the MEC. It will only intensify conflict when certain reports are not received or lost by officials. It is really designed to facilitate structural conflict between the two institutions

Section 23, Policing needs and priorities:

This is a duplication which is already covered in the RSA Constitution Section 206.

This sections allows for the Provincial Minister to report on his /her functions

The title of this section does not reflect the real purpose of this section which really is a report on the performance of the Provincial Minister to the provincial standing committee responsible for community safety. Determining policing needs and priorities is another matter altogether and the SAPS should really have a say in determining the policing needs and priorities together with the communities that they serve. This is principally done through the community police forums that are legislated structures. They have been written out of the equation and should really have the biggest say when it comes to determining what the policing needs for their communities really are.

Section 24, Cooperation in intergovernmental relations:

The MEC can only perform policing functions as prescribed by national legislation and national policy. This is a repetition of Chapter 3 of the RSA Constitution.

Section 25 – 28, Provincial Safety Advisory Committee:

S25- This section which makes provision for the establishment of a Provincial Safety Advisory Committee

The provisions of chapter 11 of the Constitution is meant for the national Minister of Police to be responsible for shaping policing policy and has the political responsibility . The Advisory committee will find itself in a corner because it cannot make and advise on national policing policy which really should be lodged with the Minister. Secondly, at national level there already exists a provision in the Civilian Secretariat for Police Act, a provision for a Reference group of academics and practitioners that advises the National Secretariat.

It is the role of the Civilian Secretariat for Police to function under the direction of the Minister who determines policing policy in terms of S 208 of the Constitution. This is a national competency and the Provincial Safety Advisory Committee is also in conflict with the Secretariat Policy Research Reference Group ito the Civilian Secretariat for Police Act

Chapter 11 of the RSA Constitution refers to the National Minister of police and not to the MEC. The Civilian Secretariat of Police Service makes provision for the appointment of a reference group of academics and practitioners that advises the National Secretariat.

The functions for the Advisory Committee as stipulated in the Provincial Bill is purely an administrative function and a duplication of the work of the department who is responsible for strategies, policies, budgets and annual performance plans. The effect of this provincial advisory committee as per the Bill is that it will duplicate and takeover the functions of the officials in the Department responsible for fulfilling the Secretariat work. This section indicates that the Advisory committee will be responsible for amongst others developing and advising the MEC on strategy of the secretariat as well as the development of APP’s. This is the function of the SMS members in the Provincial Department of Community Safety currently fulfilling the Secretariat Function such as Chief Director and the Director Safety Information and Research, Monitoring and Evaluation etc together with the Director Strategy. This section will make the functions of the officials responsible redundant and a fruitless and wasteful expenditure. It also amounts to a surreptitious and illegal circumvention of the Public Service Act and the Ministerial Handbook for Political Office Bearers which only provides for advisors to Cabinet Ministers and Premiers and not MEC’s

This provision is therefore in conflict with the role of the Civilian Secretariat for Police

Section 29, Awards:

This section which provides for the Provincial Minister to makes awards to community members could create a conflict of interest with the MEC having to issue rewards to community members and could be used politically to marginalise sections of people. This function is therefore not correctly located as it is inappropriate for the MEC to decide the upon the issuing of awards, it creates the space for poliltical biased decision making. Instead it is a function that should be managed by the department of community safety and not the MEC to avoid the political bias and subjectivity in the issuing of awards towards communities or it has the potential to create tension and conflict with an between communities and the department. An awards system must be developed with a proper evidencebased and results driven performance management and assessment process that and is not only unbiased and impartial but is seen to be by communtities as unbiased, objective, non partisan, impartial and integrity based. In its current form the awards system will lose its reputational integrity from the outset as communtities will perceive it to biased and politically motovated.

Section 30, Offences:

This section is unconsitutional as the the provincial MEC cannot regulate offences unless it is prescribe by national legislation.

Section 31, Regulations and Section 32, Delegation:

The functions of the MEC are assigned to it by national legislation – and policy.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion having due regard for our above mentioned concerns the ANC is deeply disturbed that the real intention and spirit of this bill is to create constitutional, legislative and intergovernmental conflict and a crisis to further the DA’s political agenda of opposition for the sake of opposition, rather than to create harmonization between the national, provincial and local spheres of government as it relates to community safety in general and civilian oversight in particular. Secondly that the Bill has been deliberately designed to expand the powers of the MEC to allow the DA to continue its war against community structures and take more centralised control of it by diluting there democratic right to elect members and leaders that will oppose there policy direction-and appoint there own members instead – which is to protect the safety and secuirty interests of the priveleged communtities only and to create conflict within these structures.

5. Reccommendation

That the bill be struck down down as it is:


  •  illegal and unconstitutional in numerous repects.
  • Secondly that the bill will amount to copious amount fruitless and wastefull expenditure due to the consistant duplication of functions.
  • Thirdly that the bill will create intentional and consistent intergovernmental conflict and community conflict.
  • That the intention of the bill is not enhance the safety and security of all the communtities of the Western Cape and in particular the historically black ( african and coloured ) working class and poorer communities but rather to advance the politics of the DA.


Issued by the ANC Western Cape, January 29 2013


The key dilemma facing the DA – Tony Leon

Former party leader says challenge is to grow into new markets while retaining faith with core values and old voters

Remarks of Tony Leon to the Democratic Alliance Sandton, Crowne Plaza Hotel, Rosebank, Johannesburg, January 23 2013

“Opposition Then and Now”

I have not sought specifically in interviews, writings or speeches since my return to this country last October to assess the general prospects and future of opposition in this country, and specifically the role and outlook for the Democratic Alliance (DA), which party I led for seven of its twelve year existence.

However, since this is the first DA platform I am speaking on since arriving back from Argentina last year, it seems appropriate to offer some observations and even pre-empt some of the questions which will arise in a forum such as the one you have convened for me to address this evening.

The other day that enfant terrible of our politics, Julius Malema bewailed his current isolation in the political wilderness, noting that ‘his friends had deserted him in droves.’ I was tempted to suggest that he remember the wise words of President Harry Truman, “If you want a friend in politics, get a dog.” But then fairly recently our President apparently suggested that dog-loving is UnAfrican, so perhaps that is not such a good idea.

I am always wary when people use ‘culture’ as either a club or a shield- whether to justify rent-seeking riches or to denigrate minorities – since part of the founding settlement of our democracy was specifically to champion and celebrate and protect multi-culturalism and the individual choice to adopt as many cultural identities and practices as consistent with the injunction of ‘do no harm to others.’

On the subject of friendship, I am pleased to recognize old political comrades here this evening and to have retained many old associations in this Party, and perhaps more significantly to note how many more people and new leaders have emerged in it since I left active party politics on stepping down from Parliament in 2009.

Someone defined ‘’leadership success” as the “success of the leader’s successors”. On that definition, and looking at the current track record and trajectory, I suppose that my many years leading this party and its predecessor could be termed “successful.”

I am also mindful of Queen Elizabeth’s injunction that “distance lends enchantment.” Four years outside the clashing conflicts of party and parliamentary combat and three years away from South Africa does lend both physical distance and subjective perspective which can be refreshing and clarifying.

With this as background, allow me to make the following brief observations of the political and opposition terrain I had to navigate during my time at the helm and the opportunities and dilemmas I think you confront tonight and in the years ahead:

Opposition then:

On Saturday week, 2 February, we will note the twenty third anniversary of the famous speech of FW De Klerk in Parliament, which was in political terms of such thermo-nuclear intensity, that we are still living with its after effects today.

One of the lesser consequences of that event was that it blind-sided the liberal opposition Democratic Party, among whose new members of parliament I was at the time, the freshly elected MP for Houghton. In essence, the conservative president of the country and leader of its National Party, in one swoop, appropriated most of the platform and manifesto of our party.

Although the DP during the negotiations’ process inaugurated by that speech played a significant, at times, disproportionate role, in truth when the ANC and the NP commenced negotiations, we had a bad seat at the table and a difficult set of cards to play.

This positioning was well summed up by the then ANC chief constitutional negotiator, Cyril Ramaphosa, who defined the “sufficient consensus” – which Codesa required to reach its decisions – with breathtaking candour: “Sufficient consensus means that when the ANC and NP have agreed to something, the rest of the parties can get stuffed.”

Outside the negotiations’ process the DP had a torrid time of it. The party couldn’t decide whether it should accommodate itself in the slipstream of the ANC (as some of its defecting members decided to do); seek common cause with, and the protection of, the NP (as most of its voters decided to do in the 1994 election); or soldier on alone.

The majority of the party and its leadership decided to hew an independent liberal course, more out of duty to its principles than out of any expectation of electoral reward. In the event, the results of the election -a triumph for the country and a disaster for the party – were pretty well pre-ordained before the first ballot was cast on 27 April 1994.

Although I was not the party leader at the time, I was pretty much its chief campaigner around the country. And when we could get a hearing at all (most of our meetings in townships and on university campuses were either broken up by ANC rowdies or ignored, although we had more success in the suburbs), few voters believed in the message that, in an election based on proportional representation, the quality of the parliamentary representative and the purity of the party cause trumped considerations of size and history.

In the aftermath of being sent to the new national assembly and constituent assembly with just 7 (out of 400) MPs, a major rethink was required. It was clear that if the party continued along the road it had trod for the previous thirty five years of existence it was headed for the scree slope of oblivion.

I was elected leader of this unhappy and uncertain band. I subsequently wrote that being leader back then was like being given a poisoned chalice. I ruefully noted (in a borrowed phrase) that “at times it tasted like something rustled up by Lucrezia Borgia on one of her more vengeful days.” But the one advantage of having few expectations to meet (in truth, most of the media, many of our historic backers and the majority of our  traditional -read English speaking, white and suburban –  voters had written us off) is that you can define your own agenda and determine your tactics after fashioning a strategy without the burden of expectation.

The downside is, of course, relevance: projecting yourself onto a political radar already crowded by the height and glory of the presidency of Nelson Mandela and the weight of the National Party opposition (then consisting of 82 MPs in the National Assembly, more members incidentally than the DP has today) and its dual role alongside Mangosuthu Buthelezi’s IFP of power sharing in central government, while each of those parties controlled one province as well, was a difficult task.

This seemed very unpromising terrain on which to rebuild a small party and make it fit for purpose for the newly democratic South Africa. However, amid obvious and objective weaknesses, we had certain strengths which we maximized with vigour and determination: since 94% of parliamentarians were in parties serving in the government of national unity, the opposition terrain was more or less open to us.

Thus our small band, of mostly experienced parliamentarians used the platform of parliament, and the crisis of legitimacy affecting the National Party, to broadcast our message of good governance and answerability, adherence to rule of law principles and the advancement of market-friendly, growth-promoting economics.

With a great deal of hard work and not without controversy (the attraction of some leading and defecting NP members and the “fight back” campaign among others) we were well positioned for the next election. It is also true, that notwithstanding some blind spots of his own, Nelson Mandela’s personality and presidency encouraged and gave recognition to the opposition role played by the Democratic Party.

Shortly after our relatively stunning success in the 1999 election (we increased our voting share by over seven fold and added 31 new MPs to our team and went from being the seventh largest party to becoming the second largest and with it the title of “official opposition”) we soon faced an important fork in the road. In the Western Cape, where the ANC had achieved the largest share of the vote, slightly ahead of the NP, we held the balance of power in that province, the only one where the NP, due its retention of Coloured support, beat us.

Notwithstanding our explicit pre-election commitment to forming opposition alliances to hold down the power of the ANC, I was placed under enormous pressure by some of our donors, many independent commentators, and most of the media (who in turn were under pressure from a victorious and very assertive ANC) to do a deal with the ANC and deliver the province to their control, with our party as junior governing partner.

Having two years before, resisted the tempting offer of Nelson Mandela to enter his government, I found the pressure significant, but the suggestion easy to rebut: we had promised the voters strong opposition and we could hardly deliver on this claim by essentially closing down, or significantly compromising, the independent opposition role the voters had entrusted us with.

Thus the deal was made with the NP. Under it, Helen Zille and others achieved provincial ministries and we found ourselves sharing power with a party we disliked, but with our strategic project intact (consolidating the highly fragmented opposition and establishing a governing bulwark against the increasingly hegemonic ANC, then rapidly consolidating its power over the rest of society).

We were able within a year of that coalition to formalize our arrangement – under our leadership and based on our core principles – by forming the Democratic Alliance. By December 2000, the party achieved over 23% of the vote in the national local government elections -a result which took a further eleven years to replicate in the 2011 local government elections.

Of course, what followed was a very rough ride and I will spare you the agonizing details of the immediate period which followed the formation of this party – a history of splits and schisms, bad faith and floor crossing. However, the party that stands today is the inheritor of those early and difficult decisions.

It was in the period of the NNP desertion to the ANC (2001-2004) that the DA faced its most fraught challenges. We were the largest opposition party, but the very space which opposition claimed for itself and which the constitution demarcated was under enormous challenge.

I dubbed this phase “the closing of the open society”. Although we identified the “open and opportunity society” as the summary of our policy and positioning, in truth at the height of the Mbeki presidency there were few takers for this position in wider society.

The press, with a few honourable exceptions, had been suborned by the government agenda, and with the exception of the government policy on HIV-AIDS, few leaders and organisations in civil society wished to pick a fight with the ruling party.

Within the opposition itself, parties outside the DA such as the NNP, ID, IFP found it easier to accommodate themselves within the paradigm, if not the formal membership, of the governing ideology. We had a bigger reach than ever before, but getting our message across – and even the concept of robust opposition recognized -had a hard swim in such murky waters.

The winning of the Cape Town municipality and the installation of Helen Zille as its mayor (in the teeth of a virulent campaign against us by the ANC with a co-opted ID at its side), once again as a result of intricate coalition building, turned the tide.

But by then the tide was turning against President Mbeki himself – and the once unified and mighty ANC was starting to divide, a process which reached its culmination in Polokwane in 2007, when Jacob Zuma ousted him as party president.

The very disunity which had so characterized the opposition had now swept right past it into the chambers of the ruling party itself. The elemental forces which toppled Mbeki, like the proverbial genie which could never be put back in the bottle, also released into society and the media a renewed vitality and vigour.

The “trust in government and respect the president “approach, on the back of this event and the multiplying corruption and misgovernance scandals, was fast disappearing from the public space. Against this background, the DA, with refreshed and credible new leadership, performed admirably in the 2009 election and probably might have done even better were it not for the emergence of COPE from the factionalised ANC.

Opposition Today

I have summarized this immediate past history, not to take you on a retro-tour through the DA museum, but to point out that the concept and even he continuance of real opposition in the past twenty years of South African history was by no means a sure thing. There were challenges and obstacles strewn in our path (and doubtless we placed some there ourselves). And the success of the opposition project was the result, at strategic and difficult moments, of making some hard choices and explicit decisions.

Of course the platform you bestride tonight is bigger than the one I and my colleagues stood on. It is also true that, three presidents later and after nearly two decades in power, the ANC has shed  a great deal of the moral armour which Nelson Mandela clothed around his organization back in 1994.

And although the overall opposition strength today is slightly less than it was back then (when two provinces were outside ANC control), the opposition terrain today incontestably belongs to the DA and the wind seems set fair for a resounding electoral performance next year.

Perhaps because I am no longer directly involved in the affairs of the DA, and with the benefit of some distance from the demands of party and leadership offices, I can signpost some of the challenges which you face today.

I do so in the certain knowledge that meeting these opportunities (and some of the risks implicit in them) which you confront will be quite as decisive for the future of the country as the ones which I had to deal with were determinative for the opposition. Here is my selection of some key areas:

The core constituency (minorities) of the party is diminishing. The last election revealed that the DA has unchallenged support among minority voters; the last census showed that this is a reducing bloc of supporters.

The key dilemma (and it is not new, incidentally, only more urgent) is how to grow the party in a new market (where the majority lives and votes) while retaining faith with core values and old voters.

The latter is less of an issue than the former, since the opposition space is overwhelmingly occupied by this party and there are no identifiable and credible challengers for it. And the argument that liberal ideas and policies are somehow a “whites’ only” proposition is nonsense.

But in order to attract more votes from black South Africans the party has to close the distance between itself and the majority, something which has far more to do with tone, familiarity, identity and other intangibles and less to do with objective policy propositions. But there will be a temptation to soft-pedal certain propositions in order not to scare off new potential voters.

“Culture” incidentally is political quicksand. I remember how when the NNP leadership could find no other issue to divide the early and fragile DA, they always hoisted up the fig leaf of “cultural differences and insensitivity” to sow dissension and distrust.

If I were the current DA leadership, for example, I would not get into a bargain of “Africaness” et al. Make your point and move on.

This leads ineluctably to the second challenge: can the DA retain its traditional identity with core values -from market economic sensibility to non-racial preferment to mention two obvious ones – and attract new supporters?

In other words, as the number of supporters and voters increase is there an automatic blurring of vision and values? Can you have both or do you have to make a choice.

I would hazard a view that two things are profoundly important for this country’s democratic health going forward:

The first is more competitive politics which means, simply, a larger opposition and a smaller governing party. The second, which is more complicated, is to provide not just another version of the ruling party, but a clear alternative. This entails putting forward a distinct vision, other and better policies, and offering something beyond just “the ANC minus corruption and with good delivery.”

The DA cannot be just a patronage machine providing a “catch all” message, and scooping up every shade of disaffected government supporter-from alienated Marxists to losers in the government procurement stakes.

Obviously politics is crucially about numbers. But as the party grows and as some outsize personalities, some carrying a great deal of baggage around with them indeed, are attracted to its ranks, just be sure that the welcome mat is also marked with some clear red lines which new and old recruits only cross at their peril.

I am sure that in facing and responding to these challenges, and the many others which will face you on the road going forward, you will understand quite how important it is for our country, and the wider world which still holds faith in our cause, for the future mission of the opposition to be crowned with success.